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Introduction
Most wars of the late 20 th century and early 21 st century are 'food wars', meaning that food is used as a weapon, food systems are destroyed in the course of conflict, and food insecurity persists as a legacy of conflict. (Messer and Cohen, 2006) Since the 2008 global food price crisis, food insecurity has risen to the top of many national and international policy agendas. Given the potential implications for poverty, health, and nutrition, and the outbreak of food riots, the impact of high food prices on food security is of concern to governments and aid organizations alike. These issues are particularly salient in conflict-afflicted countries where food production and distribution networks are strained and where distributing emergency food aid can be a challenge. The broader relationship between food insecurity and conflict is a complicated one. Much of the existing literature (and conventional wisdom) on the relationship between food insecurity and conflict suggests that food insecurity can be a consequence of conflict (i.e., due to the destruction of agricultural resources or the disruption of markets) and also can be a cause of conflict (i.e., through economic and social grievances) (Bora et al., 2010; Messer et al., 2002; Teodosijevic, 2003) . In these cases, this harmful cycle can result in chronic food insecurity and, more broadly, can exacerbate poverty.
In this paper, we examine the linkages between food insecurity, conflict, and food price shocks within the context of Afghanistan, using nationally-representative household survey data and confidential geo-coded violence data. After decades of external and internal conflict, along with prolonged droughts, Afghanistan has one of the poorest, least well-nourished populations in the world. According to the 2004 National Nutrition Survey, approximately 60% of children under five suffered from chronic malnutrition (stunting) and 8% suffered from acute malnutrition (wasting) (Johnecheck and Holland, 2007) . According to the 2007/08 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, nearly 30% of the Afghan population do not meet minimum daily food requirements (2,100 kilocalories per person) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010).
In 2008, due to a confluence of domestic (drought), regional (export bans), and international (food price crisis) factors, the price of wheat flour (the dietary staple) doubled. Such an economic shock could have serious implications for households in Afghanistan, many of whom are impoverished and live in conflict-afflicted areas. We estimate the differential effects of wheat flour price increases on household food security -as measured by calorie intake and the real value of food consumedbased on the level of conflict in the province where the household is located. That is, we test whether being located in a province with higher levels of conflict is associated with more or less pronounced price effects. This approach brings a new dimension to the study of food price effects, as there is little empirical research from conflict countries on such topics. This work builds on D' Souza and Jolliffe (2012) , who find that increases in wheat flour prices lead to declines in household food security, but who do not consider any dimensions of conflict in their analysis.
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we map the geo-spatial distribution of food insecurity and conflict across provinces for the entire survey year to understand the bivariate correlation between these core variables. Our analysis reveals that levels of food insecurity and conflict vary greatly across the country, which is not surprising given Afghanistan's diverse terrain, climate, and agricultural zones. What is surprising, and in some contrast to the portrayal of the relationship in the existing literature, is that the prevalence of food insecurity is not higher in conflict areas. In fact, households located in the insecure provinces of the south have relatively lower levels of food insecurity, while households in the north and northeast suffer from very high levels of food insecurity. For example, in Balkh and Badakhshan, two provinces in the north, over 50% of households do not meet the minimum daily requirements of 2,100 kilocalories per person. In contrast, in both Kandahar and Helmand, southern provinces suffering from significantly more conflict, less than 25% of households fall below this threshold. Thus from this simple mapping, conflict does not appear to be the major driver of household food insecurity.
The results of our multivariate model, however, suggest that the relationship between conflict and food insecurity may be more complex. When estimating the impact of wheat flour price increases, we find robust evidence that households in provinces with higher levels of conflict experience larger declines in food security than households in provinces with lower levels of conflict, holding all other factors constant. Therefore while conflict may not be the driving determinant in overall levels of food insecurity, it may limit the coping mechanisms that households can employ in the face of food price increases. This article is the first to incorporate conflict into an examination of the impact of food price shocks on food security. It provides evidence that conflict may exacerbate the impact of economic shocks (such as food price spikes) on already vulnerable populations. Further, it is the first to map the spatial distributions of food insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan. Knowing the geographic distribution of food insecurity can aid in targeting resources to vulnerable populations, for example, through the placement of strategic grain reserves or the improved targeting of safety net programs.
Such interventions are of particular importance during periods of high food prices.
The rest of the article is as follows. The next section describes the data and section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and maps of food insecurity and conflict.
Section 5 presents and discusses the regression results. And section 6 concludes.
Data
We combine data from two primary sources: household and price data from the National Risk and house in the country; the sample was selected following a stratified, multi-stage design. The survey covered 20,576 households (about 150,000 individuals) in 2,572 communities. The effective sample size for our analysis is 20,483 households in 394 districts in all 34 provinces. 1 1 Thirty-two households were dropped due to missing female questionnaires, which include the consumption data. All of these households are located in four communities, suggesting systematic errors in field operations. Fifty-two households were dropped due to missing consumption data and seven households were dropped due to missing asset data. One household is missing data on household size and is dropped because per capita measures of consumption and food security cannot be calculated.
The NRVA 2007/08 survey was stratified implicitly over time, which ensures that the samples for each quarter reflect the overall composition of the country. 2 This aspect of the design means that each quarter can be viewed as a representative sample, allowing us to measure seasonal variation in food security. This feature also allows us to exploit the temporal price variation, giving us additional power to measure how prices affect food security outcomes.
Another key feature of the survey is the year-long fieldwork, which allowed coverage of conflict areas. Enumerators informally secured permission from local leaders in conflict areas and when a primary sampling unit was considered too insecure to interview at the scheduled time, it would be re-considered at a later date within the quarter, instead of replaced immediately. This flexible design helped to ensure a low replacement rate. It is often difficult to obtain reliable data from conflict areas; thus the current analysis is able to provide a rare perspective on the relationship between food insecurity and conflict.
The survey includes detailed consumption information, which allows us to calculate several measures of food insecurity at the household level. The survey asks respondents about the amount and frequency of consumption of 91 food items from nine food groups over the previous week. The NRVA's broad coverage of foods, including seasonal varieties, allows more precise estimation of food consumption and calories than is possible in surveys with fewer items.
Finally the NRVA included a district market price survey; local market prices on food items in the consumption module, along with the prices of domestic and imported grains and fuel, were collected during visits to the primary sampling unit area.
The geo-coded conflict data cover the survey timeframe from August 2007 to September 2008. The department collects information on fatalities and injuries, as well as violent incidents more generally.
According to the official U.N. definition, violent incidents include the following: abduction; air strike; armed clash; arrest; assassination; finding a weapons cache; confrontation/dispute; crime; 6 demonstration; IED detonation; IED discovered; information; intimidation; mine/UXO incident; narcotic incident; stand-off attack; suicide attack; and other.
Measures of food security
We calculate two core indicators of food security for each household (incorporating population weights): per capita daily calorie intake and per capita monthly food consumption. These indicators relate to the access to food, a key pillar of food security (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006) .
We use these indicators as dependent variables in the regression analysis.
Daily per capita calorie intake is calculated by dividing weekly total household calories by seven days and by the effective household size. The effective number of household members accounts for guests eating meals within the home, as well as household members eating meals outside the home.
Food quantities were converted to kilocalories using the FAO Food Composition Tables for the   Near East. 3 The real value of food consumption (in Afghani) is calculated by combining quantity data from the consumption module with price data from a district price survey. Food consumption data include food bought, produced or obtained through other methods, e.g., food aid, gifts. Weekly values were multiplied by 4.2 to get monthly values. Prices were matched by month, item, and district. Since not all food items were available in all district markets at all times of the year, we imputed the missing elements to obtain a complete price matrix. 4 We calculated average prices for domestic and imported varieties separately to account for differences in price and quality between domestic and imported wheat and rice. 5 The value of expenditure on food away from home (approximately 2% of household food expenditure) is included in the calculation of food consumption, but not included in the calculation of calorie intake since quantity data on such food were not collected. 3 Spices and 'other' foods do not contribute to total calories. USDA sources were used for a few items that were not available in the FAO tables. For details, see: http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6879e/x6879e00.HTM 4 The imputation process filled in missing values using the first-feasible methodology according to the following order: 1) median of the 20 nearest neighboring districts of that month; 2) province median of that month; 3) national median of that month; 4) median price of 20 neighboring districts of the quarter; 5) province median of that quarter; and 6) national median of that quarter. 5 The survey includes questions on the percentages of imported wheat and rice consumed; these percentages are used to calculate total expenditure for these items.
We adjust the consumption estimates to take into account spatial and temporal variation in prices in order to identify correctly those households that fall below the food poverty threshold and, in the regression analysis, to estimate the impact of the price increases on real values. We use a Laspeyres price index estimated by quarter for each region. 6 Real food consumption is relative to the chosen base: urban areas in the Central region in quarter 1; the capital, Kabul, is located in the Central region.
Measures of conflict
As measures of conflict, we use (i) the total number of individuals killed or injured (denoted as fatalities/injuries), and (ii) the total number of violent incidents. Each measure is calculated for each province in each survey quarter. We adjust the measures by total population or total land area in order to capture the intensity of conflict within each province; this adjustment provides per capita and per square kilometer terms, respectively.
Empirical Model
The objective of our empirical analysis is to isolate potential differential price effects (on household food security) caused by conflict. To achieve this objective, we construct a simple reduced-form OLS model that controls for household and district characteristics, as well as co-movements in other commodity prices. The model includes a base effect of the wheat flour prices increases and an interaction term that allows the total effect of the wheat flour prices to vary based on the level of conflict in a province. The specification is as follows:
where h denotes household, a denotes area (urban or rural), d denotes district, p denotes province, and q denotes quarter. fs is one of the two measures of household food security described above.
Price wheat flour is the price of domestic wheat flour. 7 Conflict is one of the measures described above.
Prices represents a vector of commodity prices, HH represents a vector of household characteristics,
DIST represents a vector of district-level variables, and is an idiosyncratic error term (estimated with a standard Huber-White sandwich estimator). The coefficient of interest, β 2 , represents the additional price effect (in addition to β 1 ) due to conflict in the household's province.
We control for contemporaneous price increases in other important commodities since household purchasing decisions are based on relative prices. The price vector includes the prices of milk, lamb, rice, and vegetable oil -key foods that represent a large portion of household food expenditureand kerosene, a commonly used cooking fuel. 8 We include the following household characteristics:
log values of durable assets, housing and livestock; age of household head; a dummy for households in which heads are literate; and a dummy for households in which heads are married. We also include dummies, at the district level, for rural locations and for topography (plateau and mountainous areas, with plains excluded).
The asset values (in Afghani) are intended to control for wealth effects and are assumed to be quasifixed in the short run. The value of durable goods is estimated based on a detailed inventory of household assets; it accounts for depreciation and the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in the good. For housing, we estimate a hedonic model for housing based on characteristics of the structure, as well as the location, and derive an imputed rental value from this. 9
Food insecurity and conflict across Afghanistan
In this section we present basic descriptive statistics and a series of maps that depict levels of food insecurity and conflict by province for the entire survey year. A surprising finding in this section is that provinces with higher levels of conflict have much lower levels of food insecurity. Additionally, the raw data reveal that many Afghan households live in a state of food insecurity, and that household access to food declined between 2007 and 2008.
We calculate the percentage of households that fall below conventional or policy-relevant thresholds for each food security measure. Specifically, for each province, we calculate the percentage of households that fail to meet the standard threshold of 2,100 kilocalories per person per day. We denote these households as calorie-deficient. To establish the food poverty line we follow the guidelines set forth by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the World Bank (2010). This threshold represents the minimum cost of obtaining 2,100 calories based on the consumption patterns of the "relatively poor". The relatively poor are defined for each region as those individuals whose consumption level is between the 20th and 50th percentiles of real per capita total consumption in each region. The regional subsamples were aggregated to create a national typical food bundle for the relatively poor. The inclusion of households from each region in the construction of the reference food bundle ensures that the bundle reflects the regional diversity in consumption patterns. And aggregating the subsamples together into one bundle ensures that minimum food quantities and types are the same for everyone in the country. Therefore the food bundle reflects regional variation, but also anchors the definition of minimum needs to be the same for everyone. If the reference bundle varied across regions, it would be more difficult to assert that the utility derived from the bundle is constant. For example, if there were two reference bundles, and one had more meat than the other one, it would be reasonable to think that the more meat intensive bundle reflected a higher level of quality or higher utility. The estimated cost of this scaled food bundle is 687 Afghani per capita, per month when priced in terms of quarter 1, Central region urban prices. In real terms, the cost of the food poverty line is the same for everyone. In nominal terms, it differs across regions and over quarters.
Households whose real monthly per capita food consumption is below 687 Afghani are designated as food poor. (table 2) . (Table A1 displays Therefore this evidence suggests that, at least in the case of Afghanistan, conflict does not seem to be the predominant driver of food insecurity. This fact may be surprising to some donors and scholars who presume that households in conflict areas are more food insecure than those in nonconflict areas or that conflict is a driving factor in food insecurity. For example, Maplecroft, a risk management firm, states, "Conflict is also a major driver of food insecurity[;] and the ongoing violence in Afghanistan and DR Congo is largely responsible for the precarious food security situation in both countries," (Maplecroft, 2010) . The patterns in Afghanistan also seems to stand in contrast to research that emphasizes the negative impact of conflict on food insecurity, for example, causing losses in the agricultural productivity levels and growth (Teodosijevic, 2003) .
Households in the conflict-ridden provinces seem to be relatively better off -in terms of access to food -than households in less conflict-ridden areas. We draw on other data from the NRVA 2007/08 to verify that our measures of food insecurity are reasonable. We map average total monthly per capita consumption (Afghani) for each province (see figure 5 ). ('Per capita' consumption is calculated by dividing total household consumption by the number of household members. This is in contrast to the 'per capita' conflict measures that are derived by dividing the basic conflict measures by the total provincial population.) This measure is the total sum of expenditures of food and nonfood items (including imputations for the use-value of durable goods and housing) and is the basis for measuring poverty; it is calculated following guidelines in Deaton and Zaidi (2002) . For nonfood items, we use a nonfood price index developed by the Central Statistics Organization to deflate the consumption estimates. The index accounts for temporal, but not spatial, differences in prices.
Given the somewhat surprising correlation between conflict and food security, we note that our measures of food security correlate in an expected way with per capita consumption. The poorest households -in terms of total consumption -are located in the east and in the north, while the richest households are mostly located in the south, with the exceptions of Kabul and a few of its nearby provinces. This pattern mirrors the patterns observed for the food security measures. For example, Badakshan, Balk and Lagham are some of the poorest provinces in terms of total per capita consumption and they have the worst outcomes in terms of the food security measures.
The impact of rising food prices in a conflict country
When we extend the analysis on the relationship between food security and conflict, we find robust evidence that the level of conflict within a province influences the way in which food prices affect household food security. Tables 4 and 5 display the coefficients of interest for several permutations of regressions on calorie intake and the real value of food consumption, respectively. (Appendix tables A2-A3 display the full set of coefficients.) Regardless of the choice of food security or conflict measure, the coefficient of interest, β 2 , is negative and statistically different from zero. Holding all other factors constant, households located in a province with a higher number of fatalities/injuries or a higher number of violent incidents experience larger declines in calorie intake and real food consumption than their counterparts in less conflict-ridden provinces.
This result is robust to a range of specifications and sensitivity tests. The base specification is shown in columns (1), (4), (7), and (10); these regressions include the control variables described above. In the adjacent columns, we include additional control variables to address potential biases. First, we include province-level variables that we believe may be correlated with household food security and conflict and for which we have data: the underemployment rate, the Gini coefficient of inequality, and the poverty rate. If not included in the regression models, these province-level factors could bias the coefficient of interest. We use provincial statistics as reported in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and World Bank (2011b). 10 The coefficients of interest generally become smaller in magnitude, but their significance and signs remain the same. These variables and other control variables largely have the expected signs.
Next, we incorporate an additional interaction term to address the important distinction, in the literature and in the public discourse, between rural and urban areas. Much of the discourse surrounding high global food prices has centered on the vulnerability of urban households, who rarely have access to agricultural land and therefore are unable to turn to own-food production when prices soar (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008) . These households are typically net buyers of 10 Underemployment is defined as those who work on average less than 35 hours, per week divided by the total labor force. The exact definition of underemployment would require assessing workers' willingness to work for additional hours. Unfortunately, the survey instruments do not allow us to distinguish between those who are "underemployed" and those who willingly work "part-time". The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality in the distribution of per capita consumption, and the poverty rate is estimated following the cost-of-basic-needs methodology. For details, see Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and World Bank (2011a).
food (who depend on the market to meet their food needs); households who produce enough food to consume as well as to sell on the market are net sellers of food.
If conflict levels are associated with rural or urban areas, then our coefficient of interest may suffer from omitted variable bias. Therefore we include an additional interaction between the log of wheat flour price and the rural dummy. (Recall that the rural dummy is included as a separate control as well.) We generally see a very slight reduction in the coefficient of interest. These interaction terms are significant in the calorie regressions, but are not significant in the food consumption regressions.
In all cases our coefficient of interest remains significant.
We also test the robustness of our coefficient of interest to changes in the classification of "violent incidents". Above we use the U.N. definition, which includes several events that may not be associated with elevated levels of conflict or violence, namely, 'arrest', 'demonstration', 'information', 'narcotic incidents', and 'other'. We recalculate the measures of conflict excluding such incidents.
The results (available upon request) are qualitatively the same. We now turn to other key variables in the model. The sign of the coefficient on the log of wheat flour prices depends on the measure of conflict and the chosen specification; however, for nearly all specifications the total effect (base effect plus interaction effect evaluated at a given level of conflict)
is negative. In other words, regardless of the level of conflict in a province, an increase in the price of wheat flour is associated with a decline in both calorie intake and the real value of food consumption during the survey year.
The coefficient on the log conflict measure is positive and statistically significant across nearly all specifications (with the exception of the calorie results that use the fatalities/injuries measures).
Thus the positive bivariate association between conflict and food security observed in the maps above is also found empirically, after controlling for a variety of factors. An explanation of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this paper; however such evidence is consistent with some recent research on conflict. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose that a major driver of conflict, particularly civil conflict (which is not funded through taxation as with inter-government conflict), is the ability to finance rebellion. Thus groups in better off areas (with access to resources) may be more prone to violence. The conflict in Afghanistan is complicated, involving intra-and inter-state forces; for an overview of the conflict over the past thirty years, see Giustozzi and Ibrahimi (2012) .
Conclusions
Extended conflicts can disrupt markets, destroy resources (land, labor and capital), and take a psychological toll on the population. Under such circumstances, economic shocks (e.g., food price spikes) or natural disasters (e.g., drought) can have deleterious effects on already vulnerable populations. For households in Afghanistan, most of who spend the majority of their budgets on food, the 2008 spike in wheat flour prices represented a sudden and drastic decline in purchasing power. In this paper, we examined the consequences of this shock for households across the country, focusing our attention on differences in the level of conflict across provinces.
We found that the impact of an increase in wheat flour prices on household food security varies according to the level of conflict within the province. In particular, households living in provinces with higher levels of conflict, as measured by fatalities and injuries or violent incidents per capita or per square kilometer, experience larger declines in per capita calorie intake and the real value of per capita food consumption than households in provinces with lower levels of conflict. These results suggest that conflict may influence some aspects of food security, such as those related to foodbased coping mechanisms (i.e., adjusting diets in response to price increases). While households in conflict areas are better off on average, they may have fewer available coping mechanisms during times of high food prices due to, for example, interruptions in market access, inability to trade and barter, and worse food production and distribution systems.
Food insecurity and conflict are driven by numerous factors and, in some cases, are closely associated with each other. In Afghanistan, their relationship is multidimensional. On one hand, overall levels of food insecurity and conflict are negatively correlated; that is, the more conflictridden provinces of the south are, on average, more food secure than the less conflict-ridden provinces of the north and northeast. But on the other hand, we find that conflict may worsen food security by intensifying the negative impact of food price shocks. Developing a better understanding of these interlinkages can be useful from a policy perspective as governmental and nongovernmental organizations try to address the causes and consequences of food insecurity on the ground. Observations 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 R-squared 146] -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 20,483 R-squared Note: The measure of conflict used is listed at the top of the column. Dependent variable is the daily per capita calorie intake. Estimates are population weighted. Robust standard errors -in brackets-are clustered by stratum and adjusted for survey design. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Source: NRVA 2007/08. 
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